There is a prevailing view in the analytic philosophical theology that theistic proofs should be formulated without reference to whatsoever metaphysics, but only relying on the achievements of modern science, especially physics, highlighting its logical structure. The Cosmological argument deserved special attention among analytic theologians due to its seeming independence from medieval metaphysics and great variability: there were offered at least three versions of it, which embodies these principles. They are a new version of Aquinas’ Third Way, the so-called generic cosmological argument, both versions are analyzed as were submitted by Stephen Davis, and Kalam cosmological argument developed by William Craig. In this paper, I show that the cosmological argument should not be considered without those metaphysical ideas, within which it was proposed, as it leads to the semantic gaps that can not be resolved only by logical analysis. Analysis of Aquinas’ tertia via and modern versions of the cosmological argument shows that they all contain serious logical and metaphysical errors, which do not allow to accept this arguments. On the basis of this conclusion, I try to formulate the tasks that can be solved by theistic proofs: first of all, it is a rationalization of faith.
Theistic proofs, cosmological argument, metaphysics, third way, kalam cosmological argument, Thomas Aquinas, Stephen Davis, William Craig, tasks of theistic proofs
*According to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011, the degree of Candidate of Sciences (Cand.Sc.) belongs to ISCED level 8 — "doctoral or equivalent", together with PhD, DPhil, D.Lit, D.Sc, LL.D, Doctorate or similar.
The article is written within the framework of the project № 15-03-00211 "Metaphysics in the intercultural space: history and modernity" supported by RFBR Foundation