In the article some problems concerned an application of standard conception of reference to the word “God” are considered in tradition of analytic philosophy. The author engages in a discussion with R. Swinburne and W. Alston. According to conception mentioned above proper names denote particular things. But an interpretation of such expressions in accord with the standard view presupposes that proper referents should be assigned to them, and those to be found in a world the utterance of the name is about. But in order to do this an interpreter has to be able to identify the referent. Meanwhile even those things which we can immediately interact with, are structurally complex and susceptible to changes, including diﬀerences in presentations to subjects. This makes their givennes and identiﬁcation quite a problem. Yet more problematic looks an assignment of a standard reference to a name which is supposed to designate something unable to be immediately given to any competent language speaker, like historic object, event or person, or God. This paper analyses diﬀerent accounts of interpretation of proper names. It proposes a model of interpretation according to which proper names may be assigned standard references without the referents to be somehow given an agent of an utterance, based on a Kripkean historical account coupled with an understanding of proper names as anaphors. Its application to conventional uses of the name «God» in monotheistic discourses is critically analyzed.
Proper Name, Reference, Particular Thing, Interpretation, Utterance, Discourse, Anaphora, Deﬁnite Description, Direct Reference, Theme, Usual Talk.
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