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Черняков Д. И. Православная церковь на брянщине в период нацистской оккупации (август 1941 г. — сентябрь 1943 г.) // Вестник ПСТГУ. Серия II: История. История Русской Православной Церкви. 2011. Вып. 5 (42). С. 85-95.
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the German occupation, the Church in Bryansk, the Belarusian Orthodox Church, the Russian clergy in the occupied territories
Черняк А. З. Привычка поступаться принципами // Вестник ПСТГУ. Серия I: Богословие. Философия. 2012. Вып. 5 (43). С. 76-91.
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This article analyses the apparent parallelism between cases, one of which takes place from the deliberate breach of principles, while the other is that in which a less than optimal result is reached through a lack of cooperation — the so-called prisoner’s dilemma. The author demonstrates that in spite of apparent similarities between the two cases, there nevertheless exists a fundamental difference which does not allow them to be classed as the same. On the other hand, the reasoning behind both of these situations may be explained by resorting to a type ofprinciple or maxim which can best be described as finding a middle way. The basic structural difference between the two types may be described as follows: if the hypothesis seems probable, the given principle will condition the decision in different situations and on different levels of thought.
PRINCIPLES, CONVICTIONS, RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, DECISION, OPTIMAL DECISION, RISK, DILEMMA, PRISONER’S DILEMMA
Черняк А. З. «Бог» как имя собственное: проблема референции // Вестник ПСТГУ. Серия I: Богословие. Философия. 2016. Вып. 1 (63). С. 79-98. DOI: 10.15382/sturI201663.79-98
In the article some problems concerned an application of standard conception of reference to the word “God” are considered in tradition of analytic philosophy. The author engages in a discussion with R. Swinburne and W. Alston. According to conception mentioned above proper names denote particular things. But an interpretation of such expressions in accord with the standard view presupposes that proper referents should be assigned to them, and those to be found in a world the utterance of the name is about. But in order to do this an interpreter has to be able to identify the referent. Meanwhile even those things which we can immediately interact with, are structurally complex and susceptible to changes, including differences in presentations to subjects. This makes their givennes and identification quite a problem. Yet more problematic looks an assignment of a standard reference to a name which is supposed to designate something unable to be immediately given to any competent language speaker, like historic object, event or person, or God. This paper analyses different accounts of interpretation of proper names. It proposes a model of interpretation according to which proper names may be assigned standard references without the referents to be somehow given an agent of an utterance, based on a Kripkean historical account coupled with an understanding of proper names as anaphors. Its application to conventional uses of the name «God» in monotheistic discourses is critically analyzed.
Proper Name, Reference, Particular Thing, Interpretation, Utterance, Discourse, Anaphora, Definite Description, Direct Reference, Theme, Usual Talk.

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4. Alston W. P. 1988 “Referring to God”, in Philosophy of Religion, 1988, vol. 24, pp. 114–115, 117–118.
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6. Burge T. 1973 “Reference and Proper Names”, in Journal of Philosophy, 1973, vol. 70/14, pp. 425–439.
7. Donnellan K. S. 1972 “Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions”, in Davidson D., Harman G. (eds.) The Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht, 1972.
8. Heim I. The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases, Amherst, 1982.
9. Kamp H. A. 1981 “Theory of Truth and Semantic Representation”, in Groenendijk A. G., Janssen T. M. V., Stokhof M. B. J. (eds.) Formal Methods in the Study of Language, Amsterdam, 1981, pp. 277–322.
10. Kamp H., Reyle U. From Discourse to Logic, Kluwer, 1993.
11. Kripke S. A. Naming and Necessity, Cambridge (MA), 1980.
12. Maier E. 2009 “Proper Names and Indexicals Trigger Rigid Presuppositions”, in Journal of Semantics, 2009, vol. 26, pp. 253–315.
13. Mill J. S. A System of Logic, London, 1867.
14. Montague R. 1974 “The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English. Formal Philosophy”, in Selected Papers of Richard Montague, London, 1974, pp. 17–34.
15. Putnam H. Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Cambridge, 1975.
16. Russell B. A. W. 1983 “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, in Idem. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, 1983, vol. 6, pp. 148–161.
17 Russell B. A. W. 1905 “On Denoting”, in Idem. The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, 1905, vol. 4, pp. 415–427.
18. Russell B. The Problems of Philosophy, New York, 1997.
19. Searle J. 1958 “Proper Names”, in Mind, 1958, vol. 67, pp. 166–173.
20. Strawson P. F. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London, 1959.
21. Swinburne R. The Coherence of Theism, Oxford, Clarendon, 1993.
22. Van der Sandt R. 1992 “Presupposition Projection as Anaphora Resolution”, in Journal of Semantics, 1992, vol. 9, pp. 333–377.
Черняк А. З., Веретенников А. А. Бог и возможные миры // Вестник ПСТГУ. Серия I: Богословие. Философия. 2018. Вып. 77. С. 29-44. DOI: 10.15382/sturI201877.29-44
This article investigates the problems which arise when the concept of possible worlds is applied to modal and existential judgments about God. In presentday logic, philosophy and linguistics, modal statements are conventionally understood as coordinating the situation described or relationships between situations with possible worlds. Existential statements are in this case seen as coordinating what is being stated by default with reality. But a judgment about God does not always imply a link between His existence or His possession of certain properties and some concrete world or even the whole array of possible worlds. Having studied the problem, the author of the paper has come to the conclusion that semantics of possible worlds is compatible with preferable (from the point of view of theism) readings of diffi cult cases of the type in question if one of the two requirements is met, namely if these statements are not assigned the sense of the truth or they are understood as hidden metaphors.
semantics, God, possible world, theism, modality, existence, necessity, conditions of being true, meaning, metaphor, creation
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Chernyak Alexey
Academic Degree: Candidate of Sciences* in Philosophy;
Place of work: Russian State University for the Humanities; 6 Miusskaia Sq., Moscow 125993, GSP-3, Russian Federation;
Post: Associate Professor;
ORCID: 0000-0001-5654-7388;
Email: abishot2100@yandex.ru. *According to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011, the degree of Candidate of Sciences (Cand.Sc.) belongs to ISCED level 8 — "doctoral or equivalent", together with PhD, DPhil, D.Lit, D.Sc, LL.D, Doctorate or similar.
Veretennikov Andrey
Academic Degree: Candidate of Sciences* in Philosophy;
Place of work: Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences; 12/1 Goncharnaya St., Moscow, 109240, Russian Federation;
ORCID: 0000-0002-9048-4832;
Email: and.veret@gmail.com. *According to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011, the degree of Candidate of Sciences (Cand.Sc.) belongs to ISCED level 8 — "doctoral or equivalent", together with PhD, DPhil, D.Lit, D.Sc, LL.D, Doctorate or similar.