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Черняк А. З., Веретенников А. А. Бог и возможные миры // Вестник ПСТГУ. Серия I: Богословие. Философия. Религиоведение. 2018. Вып. 77. С. 29-44. DOI: 10.15382/sturI201877.29-44
This article investigates the problems which arise when the concept of possible worlds is applied to modal and existential judgments about God. In presentday logic, philosophy and linguistics, modal statements are conventionally understood as coordinating the situation described or relationships between situations with possible worlds. Existential statements are in this case seen as coordinating what is being stated by default with reality. But a judgment about God does not always imply a link between His existence or His possession of certain properties and some concrete world or even the whole array of possible worlds. Having studied the problem, the author of the paper has come to the conclusion that semantics of possible worlds is compatible with preferable (from the point of view of theism) readings of diffi cult cases of the type in question if one of the two requirements is met, namely if these statements are not assigned the sense of the truth or they are understood as hidden metaphors.
semantics, God, possible world, theism, modality, existence, necessity, conditions of being true, meaning, metaphor, creation
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Chernyak Alexey
Academic Degree: Candidate of Sciences* in Philosophy;
Place of work: Russian State University for the Humanities; 6 Miusskaia Sq., Moscow 125993, GSP-3, Russian Federation;
Post: Associate Professor;
ORCID: 0000-0001-5654-7388;
Email: abishot2100@yandex.ru. *According to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011, the degree of Candidate of Sciences (Cand.Sc.) belongs to ISCED level 8 — "doctoral or equivalent", together with PhD, DPhil, D.Lit, D.Sc, LL.D, Doctorate or similar.
Veretennikov Andrey
Academic Degree: Candidate of Sciences* in Philosophy;
Place of work: Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences; 12/1 Goncharnaya St., Moscow, 109240, Russian Federation;
ORCID: 0000-0002-9048-4832;
Email: and.veret@gmail.com. *According to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 2011, the degree of Candidate of Sciences (Cand.Sc.) belongs to ISCED level 8 — "doctoral or equivalent", together with PhD, DPhil, D.Lit, D.Sc, LL.D, Doctorate or similar.